Report 12
CHAPTER 2
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGNTY
2.1 The State of Sovereignty
2.2
Running with the Hare and Hunting with the Hounds.
2.3.
The Absence of Structures and the Political Consequences of Enforced Refuge
in the Jungle
2.4
Some Issues of Press Coverage
The Sri Lankan army's momentous set back at Pooneryn
on 11th November is likely to be analysed and commented upon for several weeks.
Early estimates of causalities placed the dead at about 400 on each side. A
revealing aspect of the incident will be largely glossed over. The Sunday Times
Defence Correspondent quoting `Senior officials' gave it passing mention in
his report of 14th November 1993: "Among those who were caught up in
the attack at Pooneryn were a large group of soldiers who were in training.
Instead of being sent to camps which were specifically designed for training
purposes, the new recruits had been sent to Pooneryn to prevent any possible
dissertations. Escape from there would have been only into enemy hands."
Captain Priyal De Soysa, a survivor, told the `Island' (19th November) that
most of those killed were new recruits. They had arrived in Pooneryn
shortly before the eve of the attack.
With desertion having become endemic, talk of such
extreme measures with new recruits had been in the grape vine for sometime.
We put them down to after-liquor droppings. Other suggestions were even wilder.
But now the incredible has taken place. Such cruel and irresponsible decisions,
which in a crisis would adversely affect experienced soldiers, are no doubt
being ultimately justified in the name of national sovereignty. In the name
of saving the Sinhalese nation, the weaker sections of Sinhalese society are
being ripped apart. [See Special Report No.5 and 1.5 & 3.3 of this report].
These inflictions on the Sinhalese themselves result from a refusal by the leadership
to face upto the pertinent questions concerning its responsibilities, particularly
to admit its errors and look carefully at the political options. On the one
hand are young men and women on both sides who are giving their lives willingly
and unwillingly for ill-defined causes. On the other is the rank opportunism
of leaders whose decisions on key issues are based on utterly contemptible considerations.
[See the `Counterpoint' of September 1993 on the Impeachment Crisis].
Six months ago when two key political leaders Lalith
Athulathmudali and President Premadasa were assassinated, such was
the moral turpitude with which people credited their leaders that no possibility
was ruled out in after-dinner discussions. If the leaders said one thing, the
opposite was deemed more probable. In scouring the state media for information,
people were being trained in the application of logical negation. Upon the assassination
of Lalith Athulathmudali, so many questions about the conduct of the
police were raised that President Premadasa felt impelled to call in
Scotland Yard to restore a measure of calm. Following the murder of President
Premadasa, for which an LTTE bomber is suspected, the press which
once, if not lately, poured adulation upon him, became relatively unrestrained
about his misuse of power. There was the glimmer of a hint, that the so called
separatist and terrorist LTTE had helped to usher in some overdue reforms,
which both President Premadasa's party, the UNP, and the opposition had
been incapable of securing. That the abuses of the Premadasa government
were none other than a continuation of the pernicious legacy of his predecessor
J.R.Jayawardene,now widely acclaimed a statesman, was being too easily
forgotten.
Among the most graphic
parodies of sovereignty are the tens of thousands of houses of Tamils and Muslims
in the Trincomalee District wantonly destroyed with explosives or bull-dozed
by the Sri Lankan army, in support of a political ideology. Now foreign donors
are being asked to contribute towards rehabilitation of the victims and the
rebuilding of their houses. A sovereign nation is like an adult. What does
one make of a person who burns his roof and sits in the rain asking his neighbours
to repair it?
Neither the Commonwealth Commission of Inquiry into
General Kobbekaduwa's death nor the New Scotland Yard Inquiry into Lalith
Athulathmudali's death helped to deflect suspicions the people had about
the government. It was rather the inquirers who came in for suspicion. A group
of eminent lawyers in this country published an inquiry into the Scotland Yard
report questioning many of its presumptions about the local scene,selectivity
regarding available evidence and its forensic conclusions(Sunday Island
22nd Aug.1993).
Nor were matters helped by the government's outrageous
action of buying, as it were, the silence of Udugampola, former DIG,
Police, who had previously made allegations about officially inspired killings.
Against this background of the country being on the
threshold of disintegration some urgent statesmanship was called for. President
Premadasa's successor chose instead to queer the pitch further with a declaration
that there was no ethnic problem, but only at terrorist problem. Sentiments
with a similar belligerent drift were echoed by Mrs. Bandaranaike, leader
of the opposition. To the minorities, no doubt, this would once more drive home
the message that the leaders of the Sinhalese polity, despite much that has
happened, have refused to grow up since the 50s. While the reality has changed,
these leaders thrive on the chauvinistic sentiment that emerged in the wake
of the Sinhala Only Act of 1956 and the UNP's infamous Kandy March to scuttle
the Banda - Chelva Pact. These leaders are not thinking of the effect
of such belligerence on war - weary Tamil youth, who already feel up against
a wall. Nor do they think how it would lend further legitimacy to a force, that
could give new meaning to helpless and marginalised Tamil youth, by motivating
them to turn themselves into human bombs, while fully exploiting the corruption
and incoherence within the Sinhalese polity. Nor are these leaders thinking
of the Sinhalese counterparts of these Tamil youth serving on the frontlines,
for whom life is bound to become increasingly frustrating and hazardous because
of their utterances. [Top]
We are nevertheless assured by political analysts that
the government and the opposition are committed to a federal solution to the
ethnic crisis and may even be talking to the LTTE. The belligerence they
say is a cosmetic exercise, the sugar coating, as it were,on the pill to be
swallowed by the Sinhalese masses. This is believable. An insolvent government,
critically dependent on foreign donors cannot ward off repeated, well placed
international pressure calling for a federal solution, without some cosmetic
compliance. We have repeatedly held that such exercises in fooling the Sinhalese
people and the Tamil people at the same time have never worked from the 50s
and never will in the future. All the signs are that the Sinhalese people having
themselves experienced the tragic consequences of state ideology, are far more
mature and receptive than their intelligentsia. They also have a shrewd understanding
about the real position of this country.
But even after all this tragedy when the government
and opposition refuse to take responsibility and confront the Sinhalese-supremacist
ideology that is at the root of the problem, but rather feed it, the mischief
continues. As long as the Sinhalese polity continues to be so destructively
predictable, the LTTE whether militarily beaten or not , will not be
the last word on minority insurrection.
No less disturbing are groups like the Jathika Chintanaya
with a pan-Sinhalese appeal. These thrive on the destructive nationalism legitimised
by the government, while exploiting the necessarily widening gap between its
rhetoric and the prevailing reality. These groups with intellectual pretensions
identify the terror of the state only as relating to Sinhalese youth. When it
comes to helpless Tamil civilians confronted with the wrath of the same state,
they would wantonly turn a blind eye. Indeed, in relation to the Tamils they
willingly consume entire lies propagated by the same state they claim to be
at odds with. They even go further and often feel angry that the state is too
soft in handling the insubordinate Tamils.
At the same time they attack the state using the deep
sense of economic frustration and cultural dislocation experienced by the ordinary
Sinhalese masses. These come from the government's policies which have led
to Western dominance over the economy. Groups like Jathika Chintanaya therefore
accuse the government of being an agent of Western Imperialism- notwithstanding
the fact that the war which they advocate, and now costing in effect more than
25% of the budget, is the single largest factor shackling the country. While
accusing the British of having divided and ruled in pursuit of imperial aims,
their pedantry thrives on perpetuating the same divisions that shakle the country
to foreign interests. The anti - imperialist utterances of these Jathika Chintanaya
- type intellectuals, amount to therefore mere trivial rhetoric, and rhetoric
alone.
The question is not whether our country has a terrorist
problem or an ethnic problem. The whole problem cannot be looked at in this
simplified manner. We, in our reports, have continually brought out the terrorist
nature of both the state and the LTTE. There is indeed a terrorist problem.
But it does not exist for its own sake. Unless we can dynamically grasp all
the aspects which lead to the present crisis and of the forces which are determining
the evolution of this crisis in a particular manner, we too will remain impotent.
We will continue to sacrifice the flower of our youth from both the Sinhalese
and Tamil communities for many more generations. We do not simplify the issue
and say that the LTTE is a mere outcome of state oppression alone and
if we remove the latter, it will go away. As the state has its own fully fledged
ideology and a history which it is unable to break with, the Tamil militant
struggle, although it emerges as a response to state oppression, has its own
ideology and history. The evolution of the Tamil struggle in this particular
context had taken a direction in which terror become a major component of
its articulation. The LTTE which now dominates the Tamil political
scene derives its legitimacy in part by exposing the bankruptcy of the Sri
Lankan state and its associated Southern polity. In the process of its evolution
it gained momentum by establishing its links with overt and covert international
agencies. Internally it has created an environment which enables it to keep
the people as hostages to its ideology and control. Not to understand this reality
and ignore the whole problem of the ordinary people and their fears is foolishness
in the extreme.[Top]
We have drawn attention to the need
for convincing protective structures since the issue of Report No. 4
in August 1990. Although deaths are fewer now, the reality now as transpires
in this and the previous report, is that people have no appeal against actions
of the armed forces, the civil authorities and even against the well known routine
corruption the refugees have to bear with.
The political implications of this state of affairs
are extremely grave. In village after village in the East we have talked to
literally hundreds of persons, most of them one time refugees. If there was
jungle close to their village, thither they fled as the Sri Lankan forces advanced,as
is still done in the Batticaloa District. There they remained for weeks and
months with wild beasts, snakes, illness and hunger as their companions. Looking
back over their experience they feel right to have done so. Not only did the
Sri Lankan forces kill upon entry, people were even taken from refugee camps,
many of whom then disappeared.
This resulted from the government fraternising with
the LTTE and then being embroiled in a war where both sides had ensured
that there was no independent structure to look after the interests of the people.
Nor was the government seriously interested in one as many local citizens' groups
would testify. Where a structure was established through independent initiative,
such as the Eastern University refugee camp, people flocked to it. [Chapter
4, Report No 7]. The LTTE lost
little time in expressing its displeasure. Between the Sri Lankan army and the
LTTE, they destroyed this promising structure. Life for it became impossible
after the detention by the army and disappearance of more than 150 refugees
in September 1990. Thousands of refugees, given no other choice by the LTTE,
fled the Eastern University into the jungles, where the forces bombed them but
could not touch them otherwise.
Every time they fled into the jungle from the mid -
80s, one message stayed with them. That is, their lives were spared because
the armed militants prevented, or rather made it too costly, for the Sri Lankan
army to come into the jungles. Everything else the army did only strengthened
this impression. Any reader could work out the political consequences of this.[Top]
The mainline press must assume a significant share
of the responsibility for blocking a rational appraisal of the ethinic crisis
as well as for the State's military debacles. Having backed to the hilt President
Wijetunge's position that the war is about what is exclusively a terrorist
problem, the editorials of some of these papers have sounded a note of impatience
about the lack of military progress. The consequences of acts of terror by the
government are not even acknowledged. Some editorials, which list out only the
crimes of the other side in support of a mooted course of action, are as though
pulled out of the LTTE press with the villains and heroes transposed.
Such have compounded official bombast.
Even conceptual problems intimately impinging on the
welfare of Sinhalese society are not addressed. By pushing the army towards
untenable goals, raw recruits have been sent to frontline positions. The press
and elite sentiment have thus conspired to send these youths from essentially
disillusioned sections of Sinhalese society into a death trap, without assuming
any responsibility on their part.
During many army massacres of Tamils during the course
of the war, people were indiscriminately killed just because they were Tamils.
In village after village those killed included women and children, like what
the LTTE did in several Muslim and Sinhalese villages. An essential part
of combatting the LTTE is to counter the Tamil peoples'experience that
they were often targetted collectively as an ethnic group.To describe the task
purely as fighting terrorism is thus a dangerous misconception perpetuated by
the press.
An attempt to deny the LTTE movement across
the Jaffna Lagoon through a policy of effectively shooting at civilian traffic,
was seen as conceptually flawed by concerned Southerners. [See the Civil
Rights Movement's statement on the subject]. But the press either actively
or by default supported the government's position which ultimately brought about
the Pooneryn disaster. Some lucid thinking on the subject came from former Air
Force chief, Air Vice Marshal Harry Gunathileka in an interview with
the `Counterpoint'(October 1993): "The UNHCR saw the claims
of the Tamil people as a legitimate claim to move up and down... I think that
this is wrong to prevent movement of civilian traffic, human bodies, from the
mainland to the Jaffna peninsula and vice versa. Of course you can have searches
and that kind of thing. But to totally stop it is wrong, that is why the battle
for Kilali...why the hell did you go on an operation to Kilali in the first
place if you can't hold it or if you are going to withdraw?" Such opinions
are usually to be found only in the alternative media.
Correspondents who write on defence-related matters
often get into a relationship of mutal dependence with sections of the forces
that leak information to them. Maintaininng objectivity then becomes a difficult
task. When countervailing opinion is kept out as a matter of policy, it is very
easy for such correspondents to slip and become apologists for the methods of
a section of the state.
Writing in the second part of a series on the `Black
Tigers' in the `Sunday Island' of 14th November 1993, `Ravana'
says: "Many weakly motivated LTTE cadre who had been dispatched
on suicide missions have been arrested and executed by law enforcement officers
even without the knowledge of their superiors. This has been to prevent those
arrested from being sent to an ordinary prison where a person can communicate
to others and also expect freedom either by escaping or through a loophole in
the law. This strategy has been adopted by young officers because the Sri Lankan
legal system is still archaic and does not support the type of war the State
is fighting. This is a serious matter for debate and study...."
The writer makes his context clear later in the piece:
"The intelligence operative who was to be killed (by an apprehended Black
Tiger) had distinguished himself for training and leading small teams in the
East where the LTTE was strong. The success of this intelligence officer
operating under the name of Moonas in apprehending or killing several key LTTE
leaders with the support of LTTE deserters is what had hurt the LTTE
most.....".
The claim that certain LTTE suspects are eliminated
because of the inadequacies of the law in supporting security needs is truly
astounding. Over the last 15 years a number of provisions have been introduced
under the PTA and ER to virtually legitimise murder. Is it the writer's complaint
that the laws allow for execution but not for indefnite detention? Even senior
public servants have been arbitrarily detained for 4 years and released, but
not under legal compulsion. Curiously, Ravana claims that the LTTE
dispatched an assasin to Colombo to eliminate Munas who is said to be
based in Jaffna and Batticaloa, and whose movements are naturally undisclosed.
As for Munas, the HRTF report of 29th
September 1993 names 4 officers as being identified among those responsible
for the disappearance of 158 persons taken from the Eastern University refugee
camp on 5th September 1990.They are: 1.Captain Kaluaratchi, Chenkalady Army
Camp, 2.Captain Mohamed Munas (Real name Dias Richard), NIB, Batticaloa, 3.Major
Majeed, CO, Vallaichenai AC, 4.Major Mohan Silva, Batticaloa.
The HRTF report says in connection with the
Eastern University disappearances, "...Masquerading as Captain Munas
he was the bane and terror of the defenceless inhabitants of Batticaloa during
the period." The report records a series of admissions and denials
of custody by state bodies. An SLBC broadcast on 7-9-1990 admitted the custody
of 148 persons. The report adds: "This incident is a dastardly crime
which cries aloud for a proper investigation."
During a presentation of the report to President
Wijetunge by Justice JFA Soza, the former congratulated the latter
on the work of the HRTF. Thereafter the government and the press have
been quick to forget the recommendations of the report.
Could, as Ravana seems to suggest, the `execution'
of thousands of Tamils as `suspected Tigers' be simply trivialised in terms
of the `archaic' nature of the law? It is a vastly greater issue and demands
open discussion as a matter of public interest. Apart from being a moral issue,
it should also be a military concern. How else could one account for the massive
recruitment by the LTTE after June 1990 and the ensuing humiliation of
the Sri Lankan forces? The matter is too important to be left to the peculiar
expertise of defence analysts in the mainline press. [Top]
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